"Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea"

The Self-inflicted  Quandary of Isaias Afwerki

Zerai Deres, jr. (Nov 9/98)

In the short span of five years that Isaias Afwerki has  ruled Eritrea, he has managed to set a lurid record in international relations.  Namely, that of having incited conflict with all the  neighbors of Eritrea. The first country that Isaias targeted was the Sudan. Next  on the firing line was Djibouti, followed by Yemen. Finally, in 1998 the  familiar rowdy dowdy behavior targeted, the last and by far the most important  neighbor left, Ethiopia. All the conflicts have one alarming common denominator.  Namely, they are based on the principle of Invade first, negotiate later. 

The jingoist policy of occupy first, negotiate later followed by Isaias  Afwerki to deal with international territorial claims, has been a destabilizing  factor for regional security in the Horn of Africa. Isaias Afwerki would have  been better served, if he heeded the old adage "think twice before  you speak once." Indeed he would have been better advised  (but then who dares advise the autocrat?), if he had  considered the consequences of his invasion for the umpteenth time, before he  invaded Ethiopia. With the benefit of hindsight, one can say that he never gave  it a second thought. Instead he plunged headlong into his habitual war posturing  and saber- rattling stance. As a seasoned observer of the Eritrean scene aptly  summed up the disastrous consequences of the imprudent invasion,  "President Isaias Afwerki is leading Eritrea and its inhabitants to  self-destruction" (Negash,1998:3). Thanks to the precipitate actions of  Isaias Afwerki, the people of Eritrea will suffer for nothing.

Six months into the conflict, Isaias Afwerki finds himself in a  self-inflicted quandary. He faces two choices to withdraw or go to war  and either way, he will be damned if he does and damned if he dosnot. Isaias can  opt for a dignified and peaceful withdrawal from Ethiopian territory. If he does  that, he would be held accountable for the invasion of Ethiopia. He would also have  to explain to the people of Eritrea and the world at large, why he has  made a habit of, as in the case of the Hanish Islands of Yemen or Djibouti,  claiming territory that does not belong to Eritrea by invading first and  withdrawing later. Yet, in various statements and interviews, Isaias has already  compromised himself against a dignified withdrawal from Ethiopian territory. On  at least two occasions, he has gone publicly on record and stated that  "with-drawal is morally unacceptable and practically  impossible" and that Eritrean forces would never  "withdraw from Badime, even if the sun stops rising."  How can he backtrack now?  Even if he did, he would not get  off-lightly. 

Having sealed-off dignified withdrawal as a viable exit, Isaias is left with  one option: escalating the invasion to a full blown war, as a way out of the  self-inflicted quandary. Inspite of the swagger about "battle hardened EPLF  fighters", the military odds too are against Isaias. It is worth  remembering that buried and forgotten in the rhetoric of "battle hardened  EPLF fighters" and "thirty years war" are, as the Financial  Times reporter astutely put it, "the strategic differences  between a guerrilla campaign and regular warfare, which have tripped up many a  former rebel movement in their time." A point which is, moreover,  attested by careful examinations of the outcomes of the conventional warfare the  EPLF engaged in, in the 1980s and early 1990s. The heavy losses suffered by the  EPLF in Dekemhare and Massawa, are but two of the many regular battles which  corroborate the dismal record. The inability of the EPLF to sustain war with  Ethiopia, despondent fighters and high ranking military officers, compound the  odds against the military option. Furthermore, the heavy losses and recent  humiliating defeats suffered by the EPLF, in Bure and other battle  fronts, prove the point and presage the outcome. 

In sum, by invading of Ethiopia and unwilling to undo his blunder, Isaias  Afwerki has literally caged himself in an impossible situation Withdrawal would  mean that a major reason for invading Ethiopia, i.e., diverting the attention of  the Eritrean people off the structural and economic crises embattling Eritrea,  would be lost. He may try to dodge and he may try shuffle, but Isaias Afwerki  will no longer hide form the public eye. In any case, the little credibility he  has left will be lost. 

Like every arrogant victor who works on his destruction, Isaias Afwerki is a  victim of his own conceit. Rather than face the consequences of his actions,  Isaias has victimized the Eritrean people and staked their future to satisfy his  vainglory. One thing is certain: in the end he will come out the worse for wear.  It is tragic that this should be at the expense of the people of Eritrea!!!